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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law: No Hearing Required Prior to
Dismissal for Cause of Nonprobationary
Federal Employee
Plaintiff Kennedy was employed as a field representative in
the Chicago Regional Office of the Office of Economic Opportu-
nity (OEO). Following certain critical remarks made to the press
regarding his superiors,' he was removed from his position with-
out pay pending an appeal to the Civil Service Commission.2
Since he was a nonprobationary federal employee in the competi-
tive service,3 his discharge was for cause and was governed by
the adverse action procedures of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act.'
After his removal, plaintiff brought suit in district court alleging
that the Act violated his fifth amendment due process rights and
1. The most serious of these remarks was an accusation that plain-
tiff's superior and his superior's assistant had attempted to bribe a rep-
resentative of a community organization, offering him a $100,000 grant
of OEO funds if he would sign a statement against the plaintiff. Ar-
nett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 1636 (1974).
2. Nonprobationary employees in the competitive service are enti-
tled to appeal to the Civil Service Commission any decision removing
or suspending them. 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970); 5 C.F.R. §§ 771.101-.226(1974). In the period between a removal and the appellate decision,
the employee does not receive pay. This period, moreover, can extend
a considerable length of time. See note 50 infra.
3. Such a status is the equivalent of being "tenured." For the
rules defining the competitive service, see 5 U.S.C. § 2102 (1970); 5 C.F.R.§§ 212.101 (a), 212.301 (1974).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970). This section provides in part:
(a) An individual in the competitive service may be re-
moved or suspended without pay only for such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service.
(b) An individual in the competitive service whose re-
moval or suspension without pay is sought is entitled to reasons
in writing and to-
(1) notice of the action sought and of any charges
preferred against him;
(2) a copy of the charges;
(3) a reasonable time for filing a written answer to
the charges, with affidavits; and
(4) a written decision on the answer at the earliest
practicable date.
Examination of witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required
but may be provided in the discretion of the individual direct-
ing the removal or suspension without pay.
See also id. §§ 7512, 7532.
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that it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. A three-
judge district court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on
both counts.5  The Supreme Court reversed, hoZding that plain-
tiff was not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing before an im-
partial hearing officer prior to his removal without pay, and that
the statutory standard governing removal for cause was not un-
constitutionally vague or overbroad. Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S.
Ct. 1633 (1974).6
5. Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1972). A third
count, in which plaintiff sought to enjoin his removal as an interference
with the exercise of his right of free speech, was dismissed by a single-judge court pending plaintiff's exhaustion of administrative remedies
before the Civil Service Commission. Despite the dismissal, Justice
Douglas chose to address this issue. Observing that plaintiffs charge
of bribery was a subject in the public domain, the Justice concluded
that a discharge based on those remarks constituted an abridgement of
speech. 94 S. Ct. at 1668-70.
6. The judgment of the Court was delivered in an opinion by Jus-
tice Rehnquist in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined.
The views of the Justices were presented in five opinions, which can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Plaintiff was not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing
prior to removal (6-3, Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting).
(a) Plaintiff had a "property" interest in his employment re-
quiring procedural due process protection (6-3, Rehn-
quist, Burger, and Stewart, JJ., disagreeing).
(b) Procedural due process protection of plaintiff's "prop-
erty" interest did not require a full prior hearing (3-3,
Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas, JJ., disagreeing; Rehn-
quist, Burger, and Stewart, JJ., not reaching the ques-
tion).(c) Protection of plaintiff's "liberty" interest did not require
a full prior hearing (5-3, Marshall, Brennan, and Doug-
las, JJ., disagreeing; White, J., not addressing the ques-
tion).(2) Plaintiff could be discharged by the very person who
brought the initial charges against him (5-4, Marshall, Bren-
nan, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting; White, J., dissenting to
the extent the hearing official was the object of slander that
was the basis for the proposed discharge).
(3) The Lloyd-LaFollette Act's standard for dismissal was not
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad (6-3, Marshall, Bren-
nan, and Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
In regard to point 3, the Court relied heavily on United States Civil
Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548(1973), and advanced several reasons for rejecting plaintiff's charge of
vagueness. - Prime among them was the belief that a certain degree of
vagueness is necessary to allow the federal government flexibility in
regulating the conduct of its employees. Although this degree of vague-
ness would result in "an admittedly general standard," 94 S. Ct. at
1647; the Court noted that the challenged statutory language was not
to be viewed in isolation: the long record of administrative and judi-
cial interpretation of this standard, as well as the agency rules elaborat-
ing it, served to narrow the inherent vagueness of the statute. In
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The fifth and fourteenth amendments provide that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.7 The significance of these words to government employ-
ees, however, has only recently been established. From Justice
Holmes's observation that every man "may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but . . . no .. . right to be a police-
man,"8 to the statement of the court of appeals in Bailey v. Rich-
ardson that "the due process clause does not apply to the holding
of a Government office,"0 public employment had long been con-
sidered a privilege rather than a property right to which the con-
stitutional guarantee of due process would attach.' 0 Since
Arnett, the applicable Civil Service Commission rules were 5 C.F.R. §§
735.201a, 735.209 (1974), which were substantially repeated in the OEO
rules, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1015.735-1, 1015.735-24 (1973).
Such elaborating rules appear to be of major importance, at least
to one Justice, in avoiding the vagueness pitfall. Compare the majority
opinion in Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 550 (White, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart, JJ.), with the dissenting
opinion in the companion case of Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
624-25 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Douglas, and
Stewart, JJ.). In rejecting the vagueness complaint, the Arnett court
also considered significant the availability of counsel to advise employees
on questions of statutory interpretation. See 45 C.F.R. § 1015.735-4
(1973).
For the argument that the "efficiency of the service" clause, chal-
lenged in Arnett, is impermissibly vague, see Justice Marshall's dis-
senting opinion, 94 S. Ct. at 1680-82. See also Chaturvedi, Legal Protec-
tion Available to Federal Employees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 287, 290 (1968); Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions
Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REv. 196, 235-37 (1973). On the
vagueness doctrine generally, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doc-
trine, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). One should note that noncriminal
federal statutes have rarely been found void for vagueness. Id. at 70
n.16, 83 n.80.
Plaintiff's overbreadth challenge was side-stepped through statutory
construction. The Court observed that "Congress when it enacted the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act ... obviously did not intend to authorize dis-
charge under the Act's removal standard for speech which is constitu-
tionally protected," adding that "the Court has a duty to construe a
federal statute to avoid constitutional questions where such a construc-
tion is reasonably possible." 94 S. Ct. at 1648. For criticism of this
conclusion, see id. at 1681 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAnv. L. REV.
844 (1970).
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1.
8. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E.
517 (1892).
9. 182 F.2d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd by evenly divided court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
10. See also Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1900);
Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 108 (1890).
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Bailey, however, the privilege doctrine has been substantially
eroded." Courts first made inroads in the doctrine by protecting
in certain instances the public employment interest of persons
who exercised basic constitutional rights, especially those of
speech and association.' 2 Further weakening of the doctrine oc-
curred as courts began to accord procedural due process rights
to government workers. These procedural protections were first
granted when an employee's liberty interest was threatened.13
Later, courts came to recognize that the possession of a property
interest in one's employment entitled the employee to due pro-
cess safeguards. Thus, if the employee could show that he pos-
sessed a property right in his job, he could not be dismissed with-
out the requisite due process, even though his basic rights or
liberty interest were not threatened.' 4
An early attempt to delineate the parameters of a property
interest in one's employment was Justice Stewart's observation
in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy that "[i] t has
become a settled principle that government employment, in the
absence of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the appoint-
ing officer . . . ."15 The phrase "in the absence of legislation"
11. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968). The
Court first expressly rejected the doctrine in Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
12. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
(freedom of speech); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (free-
dom of association); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1960) (freedom
of religion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of associa-
tion). Public employees also cannot be dismissed for reasons that are
"patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961).
Although the plaintiff in Arnett also sought to enioin his removal
on free speech grounds, the issue was not addressed by the Supreme
Court. See note 5 supra.
13. An employee's liberty interest is threatened if his "good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity" are at stake, Wisconsin v. Constanti-
neau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), or if a "stigma or other disability" that
will foreclose his freedom to take advantage of other employment op-
portunities is involved, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972). See also Mohr & Willett, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects
of Employee Access to the Federal Courts: Promotion and Termina-
tion, 8 VALPARAISo L. REv. 303, 318-22 (1974). For the application of this
theory to Arnett, see note 20 infra.
14. See Mohr & Willett, supra note 13, at 312-18.
15. 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961) (emphasis added). Justice Stewart
went on to note that
[t]his principle was reaffirmed quite recently in Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535. There we pointed out that Vitarelli, an
Interior Department employee who had not qualified for stat-
utory protection under the Civil Service Act, "could have been
[Vol. 59:421
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was the key to the employee's property interest. For if there
were protective legislation, such as a provision that an employee
could be removed only for cause, then the appointing officer
would not be able to summarily discharge the employee. In
Board of Regents v. Roth1 6 and Perry v. Sindermann,17 Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, expanded on his earlier state-
ment by clearly indicating the basis of a public employee's prop-
erty interest in his job. Noting that property interests are cre-
ated by state statutes, rules, or understandings that provide
for benefits or claims of entitlement to those benefits, the Justice
found the source of employment property interests in statutorily
or contractually devised tenure provisions, as well as in less
formally constructed tenure understandings."" Thus, the exist-
ence of a tenure agreement appeared to give an employee a legi-
timate claim of entitlement to his employment; unless the pro-
cedural protections of the due process clause were applied, he
could not be discharged. 19
summarily discharged by the Secretary at any time without
the giving of a reason."
Id. at 896-97.
16. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
17. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
18. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Although
Roth did not actually hold that a statutory tenure provision created a
protected property interest, the implication that this would be the case
was unmistakably clear. Id. at 566-67 & n.2. Lower courts have un-
hesitatingly found state tenure laws to create property interests in em-
ployment. See, e.g., Papadopoulos v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ.,
14 Ore. App. 130, 167, 511 P.2d 854, 871 (1973).
19. In Sindermann, the Court noted that due process protections
required a hearing, at the tenured teacher's request, where he would be
informed of the grounds for his nonretention and be allowed to chal-
lenge their sufficiency. 408 U.S. at 603. For a discussion of the basic
elements constituting procedural due process, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
Before the Roth and Sindermann decisions, the Court had rapidly
been developing the concept of protected property interests in other
fields of law. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (property
seized under writ of replevin); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare bene-
fits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnished
wages). See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALn L.J. 733(1964). Lower courts, in interpreting this line of decisions, have ap-
plied procedural due process protections to a wide range of property
interests, see, e.g., Consumers Union v. Periodical Corresp. Ass'n, 365
F. Supp. 18, 26 (D.D.C. 1973) (access to congressional press galleries);
Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 61 (D. Minn. 1972) (continuation of
municipal water service); Ruffin v. Housing Authority, 301 F. Supp. 251,
253 (E.D. La. 1969) (public housing), including permanent civil service
positions, see. e.g., Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 371 F. Supp.
1096, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp.
19741
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The plaintiff in Arnett, therefore, as a statutorily tenured
public employee, seems to have been in a position to claim pro-
cedural due process protections. The plurality opinion, however,
concluded that he had no property interest in his employment
requiring such safeguards. 20 Justice Rehnquist explained this
result by observing:
[Plaintiff] did have a statutory expectancy that he not be
removed other than for "such cause as will promote the effi-
ciency of the service." But the very section of the statute which
granted him that right, a right which had previously existed only
by virtue of administrative regulation, expressly provided also
for the procedure by which "cause" was to be determined ....
Only by bifurcating the very sentence of the Act of Congress
which conferred upon [plaintiff] the right not to be removed
save for cause could it be said that he had an expectancy of that
substantive right without the procedural limitations which Con-
gress attached to it.21
The implicit rationale behind this observation was that plain-
tiff's property interest in his employment was itself conditioned
by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant
of that interest. This rationale appears to be inconsistent with
the past development of due process protections; the property
interests discussed in several recent Court decisions were also
created by statute, and yet the legislatively devised procedures
for the divestment of those property interests were found to be
85, 89 (D. Del. 1974); Snead v. Department of Social Services, 355 F.
Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), vacated in light of Arnett v. Kennedy,
94 S. Ct. 2376 (1974). In the case of civil servants, the recognition of a
right to due process protection has been so uniform that only two ques-
tions appear to be asked: first, is the employee in a tenured or nonpro-
bationary position (following Roth, nontenured or probationary gov-
ernment employees have been held not to have a legitimate property
interest in employment, and therefore not to be entitled to due process
protection, see, e.g., Russell v. Hodges, 470 F.2d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 1972);
Harnett v. Ulett, 466 F.2d 113, 116-17 (8th Cir. 1972)); and second, how
much due process protection is due?
20. Six justices expressly rejected this conclusion, however. See
note 6 supra.
Eight justices discussed whether protection of plaintiff's liberty in-
terest required a pre-discharge hearing. See note 6 supra. Despite
plaintiff's argument that the long delay before the full hearing, see note
50 infra, threatened his "good name and reputation," the plurality con-
cluded that "at least the delays cited here do not entail any separate
deprivation of a liberty interest. ." 94 S. Ct. at 1646. Justices Powell
and Blackmun agreed. Id. at 1651-52.
21. 94 S. Ct. at 1643 (emphasis added). In a similar fashion, Jus-
tice Rehnquist reasoned that because plaintiff had benefited from the
Act, he had no right to challenge it. As the Justice admitted, however,
this doctrine has been "observed as often as not in the breach." Id. at
1644. Compare, e.g., Patterson v. Hardin, 145 F. Supp. 299, 303 (S.D.




subject to due process scrutiny.22 The plurality opinion, how-
ever, attempted to differentiate these earlier cases by adopting
two approaches to support its rationale.
The first approach relied on legislative intent. The plurality
concluded that where the focus of legislation is as strongly on
the procedural mechanism for enforcing a simultaneously con-
ferred substantive right as in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the legis-
latively devised procedures should be free from due process re-
view.2 3 Unfortunately, the plurality opinion failed to offer any
clear criteria for determining how the strength of the focus of
legislative intent is to be measured. 24  This failure appears to
22. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); cf. Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Goldberg involved a claim that the New York State and New York
City regulations governing the administration of two public assistance
programs violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. Although
the regulations involved provided detailed procedures for the discon-
tinuance or suspension of a recipient's financial aid, 397 U.S. at 257-60
& nn.3-5, the Court found them to be constitutionally defective because
they failed to provide the recipient with an evidentiary hearing before
the termination of benefits. The New York laws, like the Lloyd-LaFol-
lette Act, did provide for a post-termination evidentiary hearing and
allowed a recipient who prevailed at that hearing to recover all funds
erroneously withheld. 397 U.S. at 259-60 & nn.5-6. See also Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
The Roth case, though it did not actually involve a statutory tenure
provision, see note 18 supra, was considered by the Arnett plurality to be
one of the two cases "most closely in point with respect to the proce-
dural rights constitutionally guaranteed public employees in connectioil
with their dismissal from employment." 94 S. Ct. at 1643. (The other
was Roth's companion case, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).)
Striking similarities exist between the procedural provisions of the
Wisconsin tenure statute referred to in Roth, see 408 U.S. at 566 n.2,
567 nn.3-4, and the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, see note 4 supra. The Wiscon-
sin statute provided for permanent employment during "efficiency and
good behavior." Its discharge procedures included 30 days notice prior
to discharge, a hearing if requested, and a written statement, of the hear-
ing decision.
23. The first approach may partially explain Justice Stewart's will-
ingness to join in the plurality opinion. As a former law clerk of the
Justice explained,
Justice Stewart has ... stressed proper judicial appreciation
of the legislature's need to formulate a practical solution to so-
cial and economic problems .... What constitutes proper def-
erence [to legislative judgment], however, is a matter of degree.
Certainly, as far as Stewart is concerned, it does not mean
that the legislature's judgment must always . . . be upheld, or
that the judgment must be given the same weight in every
area of the law.
Israel, Potter Stewart, in 4 THE JusTicEs OF THE UxrrED STATES Su-
PRmE CouRT 2921, 2929-30 (L. Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969) (emphasis
added).
24. Although the plurality did note that when the substantive
1974]
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allow lower courts broad discretion in determining whether the
legislative intent evidenced in the language of a particular statute
is "strong" enough to preclude a due process review. 25 Such
broad discretion may, in turn, provide courts with a means of
avoiding hard, but necessary, due process determinations.
The second approach that the plurality used to differentiate
Arnett from earlier cases centered on the particular field of law
dealt with in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. The plurality noted that
the areas of law discussed in previous cases involving procedural
safeguards of property interests26 differed from that of govern-
mental employer-employee relationships. With regard to the lat-
ter area, the plurality opinion clearly indicated that due process
rights are still not held in the highest esteem.2 7
right and procedural limitations are "simultaneously conferred" or
"inextricably intertwined . . . a litigant . . .must take the bitter with
the sweet," 94 S. Ct. at 1644, these comments offer only limited guidance
for courts trying to apply the plurality's test.
Of course, the basic question remains whether any degree of legis-
lative intent should be permitted to foreclose a due process review once
an employee has been granted nonprobationary status. Apparently six
Justices think not. See note 6 supra. As Justice White observed,
"[w]hile the State may define what is and what is not property, once
having defined those rights the Constitution defines due process .... "
Id. at 1660. This remark also serves to remind that, with regard to
public employment, judicially mandated due process protections can be
eliminated if the legislature revokes its "grant" of a property interest.
In a case such as Arnett, this could have been accomplished through the
elimination of the "cause" requirement of section 7501(a) of the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act. See generally Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and
Due Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L.J. 89, 110.
25. Although the plurality appears to determine the strength of the
focus of legislative intent by independently analyzing the statutory pro-
cedures, there seems little to prevent a legislative body from demon-
strating its strength of intent by merely declaring that particular statu-
tory procedures are not subject to judicial review. Whether courts
would view such a declaration as a sufficient demonstration in itself
of strongly focused legislative intent is questionable, but possible, under
the plurality's formulation. See note 24 supra.
26. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (property seized under
writ of replevin); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnished wages).
27. The Court has long been less willing to bestow procedural pro-
tections on public employment than in other areas of law. As one com-
mentator has noted,
the disparity in treatment between government employees and
other beneficiaries seems inexplicable. Being fired from a gov-
ernment job is at least as serious a sanction as being evicted
from a housing project or being suspended from college. Nor
are there unique interests attending the government's function
as employer that find no parallels in the responsibilities of
landlord, educator, and benefactor.
[Vol. 59:421
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Although the reasoning of the plurality will probably not
be ignored by lower courts trying to apply Arnett, 2 greater
weight will undoubtedly be given to the fact that six justices
expressly rejected the rationale of that opinion 9 in favor of a
due process balancing test. While the finding of a statutory limi-
tation upon the property interest precluded the plurality from
making a determination as to whether or not a due process bal-
ancing of interests would favor plaintiff's demand for a full evi-
dentiary hearing30 prior to his dismissal without pay,31 the views
O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hear-
ing Cases, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 161, 207. The plurality may simply feel
that development of procedures regulating government employment is
peculiarly suited for legislative or administrative determination.
In differentiating between areas of law, courts applying the plural-
ity theory may also have to distinguish between federal civil service
and state teaching employment. See note 18 supra. While the plurality
opinion in Arnett tended to speak as if all government employees be-
longed to one general class, it did state that "in the area of federal reg-
ulation of government employees . . .we do not believe that a statu-
tory enactment . . .may be parsed as discretely as [plaintiff] urges."
94 S. Ct. at 1643 (emphasis added).
28. For an example of the phantom-like effect that the plurality
opinion may have, see Davis v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1974),
one of the first cases to apply Arnett. The Davis Court made an ap-
praisal of the "focus" of the National Guard Technician Act, 32 U.S.C.
§ 709 (1970). Although finding the Act less clearly centered on proce-
dural mechanisms than the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the Court proceeded
to minimize the importance of its determination by noting that only the
plurality in Arnett made use of this type of analysis.
For a discussion of the "precedential" dangers present in plurality
opinions, see Davis & Reynolds, Juridicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions
in the Supreme Court, 1974 DU=E L.J. 59.
29. See, e.g., the post-Arnett cases of Terry v. United States, 499
F.2d 695, 702 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp.
227, 235 (W.D. Wisc. 1974).
30. According to the dissenting justices in Arnett, a "full eviden-
tiary hearing includes the right to present favorable witnesses and
cross-examine adverse ones before an impartial hearing officer, and to
have a decision based on the evidence." 94 S. Ct. at 1674-75 (Marshall, J.
dissenting); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970). These
rights are not required under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act's prehearing
procedures. See note 4 supra.
All nine justices went further and addressed the question of whether
the same person who had been accused of bribery by plaintiff could be
permitted to initiate the adverse action procedures against plaintiff.
Five found such a procedure permissible. The plurality observed that
almost all dismissals for cause "involve a somewhat subjective judgment
on the part of the supervisor that the employee's performance is not
up to snuff," adding that "disputes of this sort can scarcely avoid in-
volving clashes of personality .... ." 94 S. Ct. at 1645 n.21. The con-
curring opinion of Justice Powell noted that the presence of an impar-
tial decisionmaker at the later hearing provided sufficient protection for
the plaintiff. Id. at 1652 n.5.
Dissenting from this result, Justice White acknowledged that fair-
1974]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
expressed by the other six justices indicate a shift in attitude
on this point from recent Court decisions. 32 Those decisions,
while speaking in the language of "balancing," employed a test
heavily weighted in favor of the individual demanding the prior
hearing. Thus, only in "extraordinary situations" would a gov-
ernment interest have justified postponing a hearing until after
the individual's property interest had been taken.33 Although
it has occasionally been argued that government employment it-
self may be such an extraordinary situation, 4 it has not been
generally recognized as such.35 The concurring opinions in Ar-
ness would not always be jeopardized by allowing an employee's super-
visor to act as the initial decision-maker, but concluded that where, as
here, a charge of bribery was involved, the supervisor could not so act.
Id. at 1665-66. Justice White was most concerned about the risk that
plaintiff's supervisor might not be able to "disassociate" his own per-
sonal feelings from his decision as to whether plaintiff could be dis-
missed under the statutory standard. While Justice White reached this
result by means of statutory construction, Justice Marshall, in his dis-
sent, based the need for an impartial decisionmaker at the initial stage
on constitutional due process grounds. Id. at 1675.
31. The question of whether divestment of property interests re-
quires a prior hearing has long been dependent on a "balancing of inter-
ests." Though unnamed, the balancing test can be seen in rough form
in cases as old as Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 594 (1880),
and Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908). Depending on
the result reached by the balance, some Court decisions have held that
the government can withhold the hearing until after the property has
been taken, see, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594
(1950); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), while other deci-
sions have held the .opposite, see, e.g., cases cited note 26 supra. No
Supreme Court case before Arnett had clearly faced this question in the
area of public employment, however, although the Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 264 (1970), did suggest in dictum that a government
employee could be removed without a prior hearing. But see Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) (dictum). Lower courts have
split on the need for a prior hearing in the public employment context.
Compare Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 371 F. Supp. 1096, 1100
(E.D. Pa. 1974) and Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 89
(D. Del, 1974) (prior hearing) with Olson v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
301 F. Supp. 1356, 1361 (D. Minn. 1969) and Sessions v. Connecticut, 293
F. Supp. 834, 837 (D. Conn. 1968) (no prior hearing).
32. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
33. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). In regard to
the shift in the Court's attitude, see note 36 infra.
34., See Shelton v. EEOC, 357 F. Supp. 3, 7 (W.D. Wash. 1973),
aff'd mem. in light of Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 2376 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 371 F. Supp.
1096, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1974); O'Neil, supra note 27, at 169; The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAzv. L. REv. 1, 88 (1972); Note, Quasi in Rem




nett, however, appear to indicate the abandonment of the need
for an extraordinary or exceptional situation before a govern-
ment interest can justify the elimination of the prior hearing.36
In reaching the result that no prior hearing was required, the
concurring justices could have classified government employ-
ment as an extraordinary situation. Instead, they avoided such
an extension of the concept by returning to the earlier due pro-
cess balancing formulation, free from any mention of extraord-
inary or exceptional situations.37
The actual balance struck in Arnett by both the concurring
opinions and the dissent compared the government's interest in
maintaining employee efficiency and discipline with the plain-
tiff's interest in holding his job through the final hearing. Find-
ing that "[p] rolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise un-
satisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale
in the workplace, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the
efficiency of an office or agency, s38 Justice Powell concluded in
his concurring opinion that the government's interest in sum-
mary removal was substantial. Conversely, he found the em-
ployee's interest less significant. Important to the latter con-
clusion were both the statutory provision for back pay if the
employee were ultimately vindicated3 9 and the assumption that
the employee would be supported, either by his own resources
or by welfare, during the period before the full hearing.40 Thus
36. In Arnett neither the concurring justices nor Justice White
spoke in terms of extraordinary situations, but instead referred simply
to a balancing of interests. A more dramatic example of this shift
in approach is Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974),
handed down shortly after Arnett. At issue there was a state seques-
tration statute similar to the replevin statute held unconstitutional in
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), for its failure to provide for prior
hearings. In Mitchell, however, the Court found (5-4) no need for a
prior hearing. Although the majority tried to distinguish the two cases,
the four dissenting justices and Justice Powell felt that Fuentes had
been overruled. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Stewart,
noted that "[t]he only perceivable change that has occurred since the
Fuentes case is in the makeup of this Court." 94 S. Ct. at 1914. Justice
Stewart openly adhered to the "exceptional situations" language that he
had used in Fuentes, while the majority opinion just as clearly avoided
it.
37. This return to the earlier balancing standard, in turn, possibly
made it easier for the Court in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct.
1895 (1974), to overturn Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See note
36 supra. If Mitchell had been decided first, the extraordinary situa-
tions standard might have proven more of an obstacle since it had been
employed in Fuentes.
38. 94 S. Ct. at 1651.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1970).
40. 94 S. Ct. at 1652. The dissenters disagreed, concluding that
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the plaintiff would not be subject to as severe an economic loss
as, for example, the welfare recipient in Goldberg v. Kelly experi-
enced. 41 Of greater importance (at least to Justice Powell) in
distinguishing a case such as Goldberg from Arnett, however,
seems to have been the fact that the plaintiff in Arnett was a
government employee. Justice Powell maintained that due proc-
ess balancing in the area of public employment must acknowledge
a strong governmental interest requiring "wide discretion and
control over the management of its personnel and internal af-
fairs. '42  This reasoning closely parallels that used by the plu-
rality.43 Although the plurality opinion and the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Powell diverge on the question whether a due
process analysis is required, both appear to agree that the courts
the personal resources of many government employees would provide
insufficient support for those employees and their families during the
period before the hearing. The dissenting justices also thought it un-
likely that an employer would be willing to hire a discharged govern-
ment employee, available for an indeterminate length of time pending
the outcome of his Civil Service Commission appeal. Additionally, they
noted that even if welfare benefits were available, a severe reduction in
an employee's standard of living was likely to result. 94 S. Ct. at
1676-77. For example, the plaintiff in Arnett claimed that he "did not
begin to receive unemployment compensation until long after his sus-
pension. During the intervening time and thereafter, [he] underwent
severe economic stress and personal hardship. He had no income and
was forced to borrow two thousand dollars from relatives. Debts went
unpaid and his family lost the protection of his health insurance." Brief
for Appellee at 5. See also Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 101-02
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Ricucci v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252,
1257 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Skelton, J., concurring).
41. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Justice White seems to have placed strong
emphasis on the difference in the "level of deprivation" facing the
plaintiffs in Arnett and Goldberg. The Justice also differentiated the
deprivation facing the plaintiff in Arnett from that facing the plaintiffs
in Fuentes, Bell, and Sniadach, cited in note 26 supra. 94 S. Ct. at 1667-
68.
Some lower courts have similarly attempted to distinguish Gold-
berg. See, e.g., Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n, 347 F. Supp. 71, 76-77
(E.D. Va.), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 238 (1972), prior decision
reinstated (unreported decision), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2028
(1974) (termination of workmen's compensation benefits does not re-
quire prior hearing); Torres v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 321 F.
Supp. 432, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), vacated and remanded, 402 U.S. 968
(1972), prior decision adhered to, 333 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 949 (1972), petition for rehearing denied, 410 U.S.
971 (1973) (denial of unemployment compensation benefits does not re-
quire prior hearing).
42. 94 S. Ct. at 1651.
43. The plurality similarly attempted to distinguish Arnett from
Goldberg (and from the other property interest cases cited in note 26
supra) on the ground that government employment is somehow differ-
ent from other areas of law. See note 27 supra.
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should allow the government considerable leeway in structuring
its employment practices.
Allowing the government this degree of freedom, however,
seems simply to be another way of considering the procedural
"rights" of government employees to be largely a matter of privi-
lege. Although Justice Powell was critical of the plurality for
employing this type of right/privilege approach, 44 the mere fact
that he was willing to engage in a due process analysis does not
necessarily mean that he does not also regard government em-
ployment as a kind of privilege. Indeed, like the plurality, Jus-
tice Powell treated government employees differently from other
beneficiaries of government largess. He did this by considering
the government's status as employer an additional weight on the
due process balancing scale. Unfortunately, the reasons he ad-
vanced for so favoring the government in the employment con-
text are not convincing.4" Moreover, the fact that federal em-
ployees themselves appear to consider their jobs more than a
matter of privilege46 weighs against this increased governmental
discretion.
The dissenting justices, while agreeing with the concurring
opinion that due process balancing was necessary, concluded that
a proper balance required the opposite result from that reached
by Justice Powell. In finding the government's interest slight,
the Justices not only argued that agency "efficiency" should be
given little weight,47 but also suggested alternatives to removal
44. 94 S. Ct. at 1650. Justices White and Marshall also noted that
the type of analysis used by the plurality raised shades of the right/
privilege doctrine of government employment. Id. at 1660 n.7, 1672.
45. See generally note 27 supra and notes 47-48 infra.
46. One survey has noted that civil servants consider "security"
to be the most desirable attribute of their jobs:
[A]mong the federal employees security is ... by far the most
popular reason advanced for becoming a federal civil servant
instead of something else; 76 percent of the general federal em-
ployees ... volunteer this reply.... [T]he percentages are
high, not only absolutely, but also when compared to the fre-
quency with which other reasons are offered. Among general
federal workers financial reward is the second-ranking reply,
with a figure of 16 percent; the ratio of "security" responses
to this is nearly 5 to 1 [security responses included financial,job, retirement, and other types of security].
F. -ILPATRICK, M. CUMMINGS JR. & M. JENNINGS, SOURCE BOOK OF
A STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL VALUES AND THE IMAGE OF TE FEDERAL SERV-
IcE 360-65 (1964).
47. 94 S. Ct. at 1678-79. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
91 (1972), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972), for the propo-




without pay if office disruption were a real threat.48 Moreover
the dissenters felt that an employee would undergo serious eco-
nomic hardship if removed without pay.49 This hardship would
be aggravated by the potentially lengthy period before a final
resolution of the dispute.50 In addition, they found the fact that
nearly one quarter of all adverse action appeals to the Civil Serv-
ice Commission result in a decision against the government to
weigh in favor of the employee.51
On balance, the dissenters' views appear sounder. The eco-
nomic plight of the temporarily removed public employee in Ar-
nett is not very different from the situation of the welfare recip-
ient in Goldberg and possibly worse than that facing the gar-
nished wage-earner in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 2 Fur-
thermore, the government's interest in agency discipline and
morale does not seem convincing in light of the alternative of
temporarily assigning the employee to a less sensitive position
in another office.53 Even the possibility of increased cost to the
government might be avoided by appropriate planning."
Arnett will undoubtedly be interpreted by lower courts in
different ways.55 Although the Court decided not to require a
48. Justice Marshall noted that the employee could be placed on
administrative leave or temporarily assigned to a less sensitive position
pending his hearing. 94 S. Ct. at 1679. See 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(d)
(1974).
49. See note 40 supra.
50. During the eleven months between his initial discharge and the
district court decision, plaintiff had not had his hearing before the Civil
Service Commission. Brief for Appellee at 5. Over 50 percent of all
adverse action appeals to the Civil Service Commission wait more than
three months to be heard, five percent waiting more than a year. Merrill,
supra note 6, at 206.
51. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 204 n.35.
52. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The garnished employee in Sniadach still
received a statutory exemption for approximately one-half of his wages,
id. at 338 n.1; in Arnett, the discharged employee received nothing
pending the Civil Service Commission hearing. See note 2 supra.
53. See note 48 supra. Furthermore, under current adverse action
procedures, an employee cannot be removed until at least 30 days after
he has received notice of the proposed adverse action, 5 C.F.R. §
752.202 (a) (1974). Thus the government must cope with potential dis-
ciplinary and morale problems in any event.
54. Although increased costs might result if the government were
forced to pay all suspended employees until their full hearing, these
costs could be reduced by shortening the time lag between the initial
suspension and the full hearing. Furthermore, if the full hearing were
provided prior to discharging the employee, there might not be any
need for a later appellate hearing, thereby potentially cutting govern-
ment costs. See 94 S. Ct. at 1679 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Arnett does make clear, however, that a demand for an impar-
tial decision-maker at a preliminary hearing will not meet with much
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prior hearing, it is not clear whether Arnette foreshadows the
reversal of decisions favoring prior hearings in the context of
other types of property interests, or whether its application will
be limited to the realm of public employment. 56 If the latter,
a further question remains as to whether Arnett applies to state,
as well as federal, employment.57 In addition, in cases involv-
ing property interests other than public employment courts will
have to decide whether the plurality's use of statutory conditions
should be pursued further despite the fact that a majority of
the Court clearly prefers to engage in a due process analysis.58
Finally, future cases will indicate whether the shift in the balanc-
ing process, apparent in Arnett, will continue.59 Thus, Arnett
leaves several paths open for future development; given the Su-
preme Court's apparent interest in procedural due process ques-
tions, however, their number may quickly diminish.10
success. See note 30 supra. Likewise, challenges to statutes similar to
Lloyd-LaFollette on grounds of vagueness or overbreadth will be re-jected. See note 6 supra.
56. In support of the latter alternative is the fact that both Justices
Rehnquist and Powell devoted considerable portions of their opinions
to differentiating the field of public employment from other areas of
law. See notes 26, 27, 42, and 43 supra and accompanying text. But in
support of the former alternative, see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 94 S. Ct.
1895 (1974) and note 59 infra.
57. Interpreted narrowly, Arnett reaches only federal employment;
it appears, however, to apply by analogy to state employment as well.
If it is to so apply, courts must reject the implications of the Roth deci-
sion that statutory tenure provisions create protected property interests,
see notes 18, 22, and 27 supra; these implications could be drawn in state
employment cases even after Arnett.
58. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. Even if they choose
to apply the plurality's rationale, lower courts are left considerable flex-
ibility by Justice Rehnquis's opinion to determine how strong the focus
of legislative intent need be to preclude a due process analysis. See,
e.g., Davis v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1974). See also note 28
supra.
59. See note 36 supra. Future decisions will also indicate whether
courts will adopt the reasoning of the concurring justices in Arnett in
attempting to differentiate among the levels of economic hardship fac-
ing plaintiffs who demand prior hearings. See note 41 supra.
60. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974), dis-
cussed in note 36 supra. It is noteworthy that only one Justice in
Mitchell made any mention of Arnett. 94 S. Ct. at 1908 (Powell, J., con-
curring). Whether or not this indicates that Arnett will be of minor
precedential value is unclear. The lack of cross-reference may indicate
that Arnett will be considered a peculiarly limited "public employ-
ment" type of case. See note 56 supra.
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